Abstract. In this invited talk, a brief survey on the developments of countermeasures against differential and linear cryptanalysis methods is presented.
We observed that if the differential probabilities of a round function of a Feistel cipher are bounded from above, then also the differential probabilities over four rounds of the cipher are bounded by a significantly smaller bound. There is a penalty of allowing zero output difference as noted by E. Biham, but it takes only one more round to achieve the same security level. In [25] we formulated and proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1. (KN Theorem)
It is assumed that in a DES-like cipher with f : F m 2 → F n 2 the round keys are independent and uniformly random. Then the probability of an s-round differential, s ≥ 4, is less than or equal to 2p 2 max .
Here
If f bijective, then the claim of the KN Theorem holds for s ≥ 3, in which case the multiplier 2 can be removed [1] .
The high nonlinearity of the Cube function f (x) = x 3 in F 2 n had been observed already in [26] . It is bijective for odd n only, so we made one-bit adjustments to it, so that it was possible to fit it into a balanced 2(n − 1)-bit Feistel cipher as a round function. We called this cipher CRADIC, as Cipher Resistant Against DIfferential Cryptanalysis, but in public it became known as KN Cipher. The cipher was later broken using algebraic cryptanalysis making use of the low degree of the Cube monomial.
Since then, designers of block ciphers continue using small nonlinear S-boxes in the spirit of C. Shannon. Would it be possible to use a monolithic algebraic construction? Recently, the Discrete Logarithm function was proved to achieve optimum algebraic immunity [7] . Let α generator of the multiplicative group F * 2 n and set
Then f gives an n-bit S-box. Previously, it is known that any single output bit of f exhibits asymptotically low correlation with linear functions [6] . The correlations are bounded from above by
But no useful general upper bound is known to the linearity of combinations of output bits. The known bounds increase exponentially as the length of the linear mask grows [7, 14] . Later we managed to establish a smaller bound where the increase is exponential with respect to the number of output bits involved, that is, the Hamming weight of the mask. In experiments, however, it seems that the linearity does not grow exponentially but essentially slower. It remains an open question, whether CRADIC would be secure if the Cube function were replaced by the Discrete Logarithm function.
The essential notion in the KN Theorem is differential first introduced in [18] . The approach taken in this work was to model an iterated block cipher as a stochastic process and assume that the rounds are independent. This can be achieved for a key-alternating cipher by selecting the round keys to be statistically independent and then taking the average over all keys. Under the hypothesis of stochastic equivalence it is then possible to draw conclusions about the behaviour of the cipher for a fixed unknown key. We adopted the same stochastic model and introduced in [24] the concept of linear hull and proved the following result for the expected squared correlation. 
Here, for random variable Z in Z (binary strings) we defined
Then the linear hull (originally called as approximate linear hull) was defined as the set of all linear approximations
of plaintext, ciphertext and key, with fixed input and output masks a and b, but letting the key mask vary. Thus taking squares of the correlations and summing over c gives the average correlation over the cipher with plaintext mask a and ciphertext mask b. J. Daemen abandoned the Markov cipher model and took the fixed key approach [11] . He investigated correlations of linear approximations over a key alternating block cipher E, with round functions x → f i (x + K i ), and fixed set of round keys K 0 , . . . , K r . Given vector Boolean function:
Then the correlation of a composed function computed as the matrix product
from where we obtain
where u 0 and u r are the linear masks of data after 0 and r rounds of encryption, respectively. This result holds for all fixed keys. By taking the squares and averaging over uniformly distributed and independent keys we get as a corollary
This result was given in [24] for the special case of DES. Related to this, let us also observe that the correlation of a single trail of a linear hull, taken over plaintext, ciphertext and key, gives another presentation of the piling-up lemma
where a = u 0 , b = u r , and c is in unique correspondence with the trail masks u 1 , . . . , u r−1 . Finally let us make an observation of the effect of key scheduling, which should be designed in such a way that the magnitudes of the correlations 
Provable Security in Practice
It would be easier to achieve security guarantees against differential and linear attacks for round functions composed of a highly nonlinear monolithic design. In case of substitution permutation networks and similar designs such as AES, cryptographers must work harder. The basic approach is to design the diffusion layer in such a way that the minimum number of active S-boxes involved in the attack is large enough to make the linear trail correlations and differential characteristic probabilities sufficiently small. To achive this goal, the designers of the AES used MDS matrices for creating larger S-boxes and the Wide-Trail Strategy for ensuring diffusion of trails over the entire width of the cipher [10] . Then obtaining any useful upper bounds to linear correlations and differential probabilities becomes hard. The best known upperbounds for 4 and more rounds are due to L. Keliher [16] .
The block cipher PRESENT makes use of bit permutations between rounds for optimal diffusion [5] . Its hardware optimized S-box exhibits, however, strong linear correlations for single-bit masks. Consequently, fairly accurate estimates of correlations can be obtained using single-bit linear approximation trails. As demonstrated in [9] , linear hull effect is significant and therefore linear attacks are more powerful than initially estimated by the designers. The other side of the coin is that now we have better estimates of resistance of PRESENT against linear attacks. Can the linear hull effect for PRESENT be computed with sufficient accuracy using single-bit trails only is an interesting question.
Linear Approximations and Distributions
The correspondence between correlations of linear projections and probability distributions has been well-known for cryptographers since at least [2] but not exploited in cryptanalysis until in the multidimensional linear cryptanalysis [15] . It allows to use a number of linear approximations simultaneously. More generally, let Z be a vector of (binary) random variables over domain Z. By applying the inverse Walsh-Hadamard transform to (1) we get
u·z .
In cryptanalysis, Z is a random variable, which can be sampled from cipher data, such as multidimensional linear approximation, difference, or ciphertext from chosen biased plaintext, anything expected to have non-random behaviour. In this sense, linear approximations, that is, linear projection z → u · z gives a universal tool for analyzing probability distributions. For example, G. Leander used it to prove that the statistical saturation attack averaged over the fixations and the multidimensional linear cryptanalysis attack are essentially the same [19] . This approach is not restricted to binary variables but can be extended to any finite group. For example, projections x → ux mod p, for p prime, have been used in cryptanalysis of block ciphers with non-binary diffusion layer [3] . This leads to the following generalized notion of correlation
q ux for a function f : Z q → Z p and positive integers p and q. The generalized bent functions achieve the smallest linearity with respect to generalized correlation [17] . The Discrete Logarithm function for integers is another example with known asymptotic upper bound of linearity [13] . This upperbound is of the same magnitude than the bound conjectured to the binary Discrete Logarithm function. Given such Z related to a cipher, how many samples of Z is needed to distinguish it from a true random variable? If the distribution of Z is close to uniform, then the answer can be given in terms of the capacity of the distribution Z defined as follows:
where M = |Z|. Using the relationship between the distribution and correlations we obtain
Let us summarize the known upper bounds of data complexities for two commonly used distinguishers.
The strongest distinguisher based on the log-likelihod ratio (LLR) requires good knowlege of the probability distribution of Z. If it is available, then the data requirement of the LLR distinguisher can be given as:
where the constant λ depends only on the success probability. In cryptanalysis, the variable Z and its probability distribution typically depend on the unknown key. While the χ 2 distinguisher is less optimal than the LLR, it can be used also in this case, as it does not require knowledge of the distribution of Z. Its data requirement is
, where
Cryptanalysts aim at minimizing the data complexity. To be able to use the LLR bound, they must make convincing arguments that LLR works. Else they are left with the higher value given by the χ 2 complexity bound. Cryptographers want to work in the opposite direction and claim as high values as possible for the data complexity. In general, provable security may be difficult to achieve given only such upper bounds of average data complexities. It takes practical experiments and other evidence to see what the actual distinguishing data complexities are and how much they vary with the keys.
